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The conflict between bondholders and shareholders has been an important issue in 
financial research. However, measuring this conflict continues to be problematic. 
Common proxies for bondholder-shareholder (B-S) conflict capture variation from 
multiple constructs, which makes it unclear as to the interpretation of statistical tests 
based on these proxies. In order to test empirical hypotheses, a reliable proxy is needed. 
This dissertation will attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by demonstrating a 
method to create a direct empirical proxy for the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders. The proxy is subjected to a variety of validity tests to determine whether it 
behaves as predicted by theory.  
First, this dissertation will construct an empirical proxy for this conflict. The 
proxy is calculated using a two-step regression procedure. First, determinants of leverage 
are regressed on leverage. The residuals from this regression are used to represent 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders. This proxy is validated in multiple 
contexts to assess its robustness with respect to various estimation methods and empirical 
settings.  
With this proxy, a direct test is possible for whether the conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders affects the level of accounting conservatism for a 
company, mirroring the tests in Ahmed et al. (2002). Ahmed et al. (2002) finds a higher 
level of conservatism in companies with higher levels of conflict, but employs proxies 
that do not measure this conflict exclusively.  
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Second, the dissertation will test whether conflict affects the established 
relationship between Accrual Quality and Cost of Capital. Previous literature (Myers 
1977, Black 1976, among others) has established a theoretical link between conflict and 
optimal capital structure. Ahmed et al. (2002) establishes a relationship between conflict 
and accounting conservatism. This leaves an open question as to the nature of the 
relationship between conflict, Accruals Quality, and the Cost of Capital. Managers may 
be less likely to manipulate accruals when conflict is high due to the increased costs of 
capital from low-quality earnings. Manipulation of earnings also can serve to exacerbate 
the conflict between bondholders and shareholders by changing the information 
environment of the firm. Bondholders will be less likely to trust financial information in 
determining the level of asset substitution that the firm is engaged in. Thus, accruals 
quality has a direct effect on cost of capital as previously shown (See Francis et al., 
2004), but also has an indirect effect through how it affects bondholder shareholder 
conflict. 
Third, this dissertation will test whether the B-S conflict affects the relationship 
between real earnings management and Cost of Capital. From Roychowdhury (2006), 
real earnings management is the manipulation of business activities in order to influence 
accounting reporting outcomes. Kim and Sohn (2013) show that real earnings 
management affects the cost of capital for a firm. Further, both underinvestment and asset 
substitution relate to a firm’s risk position with respect to its assets. Overproduction of 
inventory aligns with asset substitution. The firm’s assets have been made illiquid by 
overproduction of inventory. If the firm is able to sell the additional inventory, the 
reduction in costs will provide the firm more profit. If the firm is unable to sell this 
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inventory, the firm will realize increased losses. Thus, real earnings management can 
increase the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. With the knowledge that 
conflict affects the firm’s cost of capital, it is intuitive that real earnings management 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter          Page 
 
1 Introduction         1 
 
2 Developing an Empirical Proxy for Conflict between Bondholders and 
Shareholders  
 
  Introduction        3 
  Theory Development and Research Topic    5 
  Data Sources and Variable Calculations    11 
  Empirical Results       16 
  Conclusions        19 
  Tables         21 
 
3 Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict, Accruals Quality, and the Cost of Equity 
Capital 
 
  Introduction        31 
  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development   32 
  Hypotheses        34 
  Models        37 
  Variables        39 
  Results        41 
  Conclusions        42 
  Tables         44 
 
4 The Effects of Real Earnings Management on Cost of Capital through 
Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict 
 
  Introduction        51 
  Literature Review and Hypothesis Development   52 
  Models        56 
  Variables        57 
  Results        60 
  Conclusions        61 
  Tables         63 
 
5 Conclusion         70 
 
 
References          72 
 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table           Page 
1 Summary Statistics for Chapter 2      21 
 
2 Correlations between regression variables for Paper 1   22 
 
3 Correlations between measures of Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict 23 
 
4 Results from Book Value Leverage on Altman's Z and other covariates 24 
 
5 Regressions of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-Shareholder conflict proxy 25 
 
6 Simultaneous estimation of cost of equity and debt    27 
 
7 Regressions of Alternate Calculation of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-
Shareholder conflict proxy       29 
 
8 Summary Statistics for Chapter 3      44 
 
9 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Accruals Quality and  
Conflict         45 
 
10 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Discretionary Accruals  
Quality and Conflict        46 
 
11 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Regression-Based  
Discretionary Accruals Quality and Conflict     48 
 
12 Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict regressions with measures of Accruals  
Quality         49 
 
13 Summary Statistics for Chapter 4      63 
 
14 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Real Earnings  
Management, Conflict, and Accruals Quality    64 
 
15 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Real Earnings  
Management, Conflict, and Accruals Quality mediation   66 
 
16 Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Real Earnings  
Management, Conflict, and Accruals Quality moderation   68 
 
17 Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict regressions with measures of Real  





 In the accounting literature, many variables are measured by proxy. The 
theoretical constructs that we deal with are either not measureable or would be 
exceedingly difficult or costly to measure directly. For example, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model accrual quality by the residuals from a regression of intertemporal cash 
flows on the change in working capital. With such proxies, we are able to, at least 
partially, capture the underlying construct for hypothesis testing. This dissertation will 
attempt to bridge a gap in the literature regarding bondholder-shareholder conflict. To 
date, most proxies for this conflict are confounded by their linkage to multiple theoretical 
constructs. An example of this is the use of leverage as a proxy for conflict. Leverage is 
determined not only by the conflict between investor types, but also by bankruptcy risk, 
tax shields, and other concerns. If the influence of these other constructs can be removed, 
then a better measure of conflict would be obtained. With such a measure, it would be 
possible to conduct various empirical tests with more confidence that test results are 
interpretable as relationships between empirical constructs. Thus, in conducting a test 
between bondholder-shareholder conflict and earnings management, the creation of an 
appropriate proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict is imperative. 
 Earnings management has been an important topic in the accounting literature. 
Many innovations have arisen in the empirical measurement of constructs relating to 
earnings management. Two of the most prominent constructs are accruals quality and real 
earnings management. Both of these constructs are represented by well-established 
empirical proxies (See Francis et al. 2005, Roychowdhury 2006). With these proxies, it is 
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possible to test the relationships between these accounting constructs, bondholder-
shareholder conflict, and cost of capital. 
 This dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part develops and 
validates an empirical proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict. Further, it tests the 
nature of this relationship with firms’ cost of capital. Theoretically, we expect that 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders results in investors charging higher prices 
for their capital. This expectation is tested in a variety of empirical settings.  
Second, the dissertation tests the relationship between accruals quality, conflict, 
and cost of capital. Accruals quality represents the information environment for the firm. 
The information environment for investors can affect the level of conflict between 
investors as different investor types have differential sensitivity to earnings variability. 
Thus, an indirect effect between accruals quality and cost of capital is hypothesized 
through conflict.  
Finally, this dissertation tests the relationship between real earnings management, 
conflict, and the cost of capital. Real earnings management affects the risk position of the 
firm. The risk position of the firm is the nature of a source of conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders. Thus, real earnings management is hypothesized to have 





 DEVELOPING AN EMPIRICAL PROXY FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN 
BONDHOLDERS AND SHAREHOLDERS 
I. Introduction 
 How do companies choose their financing structure? The fields of economics, 
finance, and accounting all have made significant contributions to the understanding of 
the selection criteria in this decision. Determinants of capital structure have been a topic 
of research for over half of a century in the business literature. These determinants can 
produce significant economic consequences, and thus still are an important topic in 
accounting and finance literature. IPOs, seasoned offerings, and debt issues all are 
significant economic events that are directly related to capital structure.  
  Modigliani and Miller (1958) introduced what has become the modern 
understanding of capital structure. This work posited the theory of capital structure 
irrelevance. Capital structure irrelevance theorizes that there is no difference in the value 
of a firm that finances its operations with debt and one that finances its operations with 
equity. The initial set of assumptions used to arrive at this conclusion allowed the 
researchers to create a framework for understanding the concept of an optimal capital 
structure. They recognize that relaxing these assumptions can lead to determinants of 
optimal capital structures. Much research, both theoretical and empirical, has followed 
from relaxing these assumptions.  
Many studies have examined the determinants of a company’s optimal capital 
structure.  Theories for optimal capital structure include static trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory. Trade-off theories explain optimal capital structure in terms of 
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capital structure selections that maximize future cash flows to the firm. The optimal level 
of debt and equity is the one that optimizes the tradeoffs in the selection of both types of 
capital. Cost of equity regressions appeal to the static trade-off theory of optimal capital 
structure. If research can show that a variable of interest affects the cost of capital, that 
variable can be said to affect the tradeoff between debt and equity for that firm. Affecting 
the tradeoffs would then affect the firm’s optimal capital structure. If a variable is shown 
to have a positive correlation with a firm’s cost of equity, it follows that the firm would 
find that equity is more expensive at high levels of this variable. In this case, the firm 
would have heightened incentive to select relatively cheaper debt as part of its capital 
structure.  
 Bondholder-Shareholder conflict has represented a prominent theoretical 
consideration for optimal capital structure in the decades of research following 
Modigliani and Miller’s 1958 work. Despite interest in this topic, limited progress has 
ensued on the development of empirical proxies for this conflict. Ahmed et al. (2002) 
propose three measures to measure conflict: leverage, dividend policy, and the standard 
deviation of return on assets (ROA). Other proxies in the literature include debt 
covenants and the use of convertible debt. These proxies are problematic as they are 
linked to underlying constructs other than the conflict between investors. For example, 
leverage sometimes is used to represent bondholder-shareholder conflict. Leverage also 
represents bankruptcy risk (see Altman 1968, 2000), optimization of tax shields 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2006, Mello and Parsons 1992), among others. Thus, testing hypotheses 
related to bondholder-shareholder conflict with leverage alone is imprecise; the 
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constructs to which leverage is related are not disambiguated so that the effect of 
bondholder-shareholder conflict is observed.  
 This paper attempts to improve on existing proxies for bondholder-shareholder 
conflict. An empirical proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict is constructed using a 
regression approach. This proxy is evaluated for efficacy with several tests and is used to 
examine the relationship between optimal capital structure and conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders. First, a sound empirical proxy for bondholder-shareholder 
conflict is developed and subjected to various robustness tests. The creation of a 
bondholder-shareholder conflict proxy allows for direct testing of hypotheses that relate 
to this conflict. Second, the economic impact of this conflict is demonstrated by its 
relationship with the firm’s cost of capital.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops theory that 
leads to the determination of the proxy for conflict.  Section 3 comprises data sources and 
descriptions. Section 4 provides the empirical results of the calculation of the proxy. 
Section 5 deliberates conclusions and areas for continued work. 
II. Theory Development and Research Topic 
 The importance of bondholder-shareholder conflict in optimal capital structure 
research is evident by the volume of literature on the topic. However, the empirical 
proxies that measure this conflict tend to be noisy and ambiguous. For example, leverage 
is cited as a proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict in many estimation settings. 
Ahmed et al. (2002), for instance, use leverage as one of their proxies for conflict. 
However, leverage is theoretically tied to multiple constructs including bondholder-
shareholder conflict, bankruptcy risk, and tax shields, among others. The coefficient on 
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leverage in a cost of equity regression could then represent any or all of these constructs. 
This is true for other currently used proxies for this conflict including dividend policy 
(Ahmed et al. 2002), the standard deviation of ROA (Ahmed et al. 2002), debt covenants 
(Nash et al. 2003), and the use of convertible debt (Nash et al. 2003).   
 A suitable proxy for this conflict would capture the underlying construct of 
conflict while excluding the influence of other constructs. With such a proxy, direct tests 
regarding the conflict between bondholders and shareholders and other theoretical 
constructs are possible. This paper uses a two-step regression procedure to create this 
proxy. In the first step, leverage is regressed on determinants of leverage that do not 
capture conflict between bondholders and shareholders. The residuals from the regression 
represent the portion of the optimal leverage decision that is attributable to bondholder-
shareholder conflict. If a firm has more leverage than is explained by non-conflict 
determinants of leverage, then this leverage will contribute to conflict between the two 
investor types. This treatment of the residuals is symmetrical with the treatment of 
leverage in Ahmed (2002). Higher levels of leverage are indicative of higher levels of 
bondholder-shareholder conflict (Parrino and Weisbach, 1999). Thus, higher levels of 
unexplained leverage from the first-step regression represent conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders. 
  This regression methodology is common for various proxies in business research 
(Murphy and Topel 2002 lists many applications). In accounting, Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) use the residuals from regression accruals on cash flows to create a proxy for 
accrual quality. Lipe (1990) uses the residuals from an autoregressive regression to create 
a proxy for earnings predictability. Demerjian et al. (2012) use a regression method to 
7 
 
calculate the level of managerial ability. The following subsections describe the 
determinants of leverage and their measurement in the first-step regression on leverage. 
Optimal Capital Structure 
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) began the modern discussion of optimal capital 
structure. Their analytical model provides a framework for understanding the forces that 
determine the cost of capital for a firm. Subsequent research has provided insight into the 
factors that determine a firm’s optimal capital structure. These factors include: the tax 
benefit of debt, bankruptcy risk, and agency conflicts, among others (Kraus and 
Litzenberger 1973; Myers 1977; Parrino and Weisbech 1999; Morellec 2004).  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) state this explicitly as “the market value of any firm 
is independent of its capital structure…” in proposition 1. Many assumptions pave the 
way for these conclusions, including: managers acting in the best interest of shareholders, 
the absence of bankruptcy costs, the absence of transaction costs, and a full information 
environment, among others. With these assumptions and available empirical evidence, 
the authors conclude that the capital structure of the firm is unrelated to its market value. 
They recognize that some of their assumptions must be relaxed in order to develop a full 
understanding of capital structure. 
One proposition for optimal capital structure is the static trade off theory. In this 
theory, firms find the optimal amount of debt and equity capital based on costs related to 
each capital type. Many variables have been shown to affect the cost of capital. This 
paper follows this stream of research by demonstrating the effect of bondholder-
shareholder conflict on the cost of equity. With this test, we can directly observe the 
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effect of bondholder-shareholder conflict on the firms cost of equity, and, consequently, 
the optimal capital structure of the firm. 
Smith and Warner (1979) provide theory on the effect bondholder-shareholder 
conflict in capital structure determination. They identify four sources of conflict: asset 
substitution, claim dilution, underinvestment, and dividend policy. In each of these 
situations, the position of the bondholders is weakened by managerial actions. In these 
cases, the value of the firm is altered by capital structure. In the case of asset substitution, 
underinvestment, and dividend policy, the operating decisions of the firm are modified 
due to capital structure concerns. In claim dilution, the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders affect the capital structure selection by managers. Taken together, these 
sources of conflict represent significant pressures that influence a firm’s capital structure 
and value. 
Tax Benefit Versus Bankruptcy Risk 
The tax benefit from debt arises from the deductibility of interest payments. When 
a firm distributes cash to investors in the form of interest, it deducts this interest from 
taxable income. On the other hand, cash distributed to investors in the form of dividends 
is not deductible from taxable income. The tax savings yields an increase in cash flows to 
the firms over time. Thus, the selection of debt instead of equity can increase the cash 
flows of the firm. However, taking on more debt means that the company is contractually 
obligated to make interest payments. If the level of debt becomes sufficiently high, the 
company will not be able to make payments and will become insolvent. If the company 
declares bankruptcy and goes out of business, its future cash flows will be zero. Taken 
together, it is shown that there is a unique optimal solution to the level of debt in a firm’s 
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capital structure. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) demonstrate this tradeoff and show that 
companies can attain an optimal level of leverage based on both bankruptcy costs and the 
tax benefit of debt. 
Based on this theoretical work, the optimal level of leverage should be determined, 
at least in part, by the firm’s tax structure and the bankruptcy risk of the firm. As a firm 
generates higher taxable income, it has higher potential benefits from the deductibility of 
interest payments. However, the costs of bankruptcy to a firm limit the amount of debt 
that is optimal. At very high levels of leverage, the costs of bankruptcy outweigh the 
benefits of the tax shield created by interest payments. Thus, we would expect a firm’s 
leverage to be positively associated with its tax rate and negatively associated with its 
bankruptcy risk. 
Other Factors That Influence Leverage Selection 
Other factors have been shown to affect the selection of optimal capital structure 
through effects on cost of debt or leverage. Fama and French (1992, 1993) find that a 
three factor model explains much of the variation in cost of equity. This model uses the 
beta from the Sharpe-Lintner (1964) CAPM model and adds two additional factors: SMB 
and HML. The SMB factor is the difference in returns from small and large market 
capitalization firms; the HML factor is the difference in returns from high and low book 
to market ratio firms. These market factors are shown to impact the bond returns of low 
quality bonds, but not for higher quality or government bonds. Although they were 
shown to be important for only a subset of bonds, this paper includes these three market 
level risk factors in the first step regressions.  
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Smith and Watts (1992) and Skinner (1993) examine characteristics of optimal 
capital structure in firms with relation to their investment opportunity set. Smith and 
Watts (1992) document that firms with greater investment opportunities tend to have 
lower leverage. They proxy a firm’s investment opportunity set by firm assets divided by 
firm market value. Further, Skinner (1993) documents that firms with higher investment 
opportunities have fewer debt covenants. Both papers use the relationship of the firm’s 
market value and book value of assets to proxy for investment opportunity set. Following 
Chung and Pruitt (1994), this relationship is captured by their estimated Tobin’s Q. This 
variable, controls for the effects of differential investment opportunity sets on leverage 
choice. 
This paper also includes two common controls for regressions. Liquidity is 
included in the controls for the first step regression as firms with higher liquidity are less 
likely to be unable to cover debt payments. Liquidity can also reduce bankruptcy 
concerns by allowing firms to more easily handle uncertain cash payments or take 
investment opportunities. Total assets is included in the first-step regression reasoning 
that larger firms can manage higher leverage more easily than smaller firms. This can be 
due to many size-related effects.  
Cost of Equity 
The second step regression is the standard cost of equity regression. Control variables 
for the regression follow Dhaliwal (2007). In the static trade off theory, cost of equity and 
cost of debt are substitutes. Their relative benefits and costs are used by managers to 
select an optimal level of each. Thus, the cost of debt is included in cost of equity 
regressions. Market level risk factors (the difference between small and big market 
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capitalization firms, high minus low book to market ratio firms, and the difference 
between the market and the risk free rate of return (hereafter SMB, HML, and MKT_RF), 
respectively), firm size (natural log of assets), book to market ratio, and the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecasts, as well as the additional controls of Altman’s Z score, 
Tobin’s Q, and firm liquidity are used as control variables. This paper uses pooled 
regression, clustered standard errors, industry and time fixed effects, and Fama-Macbeth 
regressions to test the relationship between conflict and cost of equity.  
III. Data Sources and Variable Calculations   
 Data are collected from Compustat, CRSP, Kenneth French’s data library, and 
IBES. A total of 53,744 observations are obtained from this intersection between years 
1990 and 2012. Missing values in the datasets reduce the number of observations in 
regressions.  The number of non-missing observations is reported for each model 
specification in these tests. 
The paper calculates the Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and 
the Gode and Mohanram (2003) implied cost of equity models and uses the average of 
these in reported cost of equity regressions. In each of these, the Hou et al. (2012) method 
is used to estimate future returns for each cost of equity. The Hou et al. (2012) method 
uses regression-based estimates of future performance rather than analyst-based estimates 
in the calculation of firms’ cost of equity. This allows for calculation of cost of equity 
across firms where analyst data is unavailable, thus providing a larger sample of firms 
with available data for analysis. Analyst forecasts have been shown to be optimistically 




The Gebhardt et al. (2001) and Claus Thomas costs of equity are found by solving 
for the rate (denoted as rGLS and rCT, respectively) that equates a firm’s market value as a 
function of its current book value and its discounted future returns on equity. 
Theoretically, a firm is worth the value of its net assets and the discounted value of all of 
its future earnings. The Gebhardt et al. (2001) cost of equity uses eleven years of 
projected earnings per share and a terminal value to capture projected past this point. The 
Claus and Thomas (2001) use five years of projected earnings per share and a similar 
terminal value that is adjusted for the risk free rate of return. The equations and variable 
definitions for both of costs of equity can be found in the Appendix. The Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) cost of equity is calculated using the equations (taken from page 403 
of Gode and Mohanram 2003) presented in Appendix B. In Gode and Mohanram (2003), 
gamma is set equal to the risk free rate of return minus three. In both cases, the median 
analyst forecast is used for eps forecasts. In a robustness test, actual values of EPS are 
used in place of forecasts. Firms’ cost of debt is measured by total interest payments 
divided by total long-term debt.  
Following Ahmed et al. (2002), leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided 
by total assets. This measure of leverage represents the claims that debtholders have on a 
company’s assets. Cost of debt is used as a control variable in the cost of equity 
regressions. Because static trade-off theories imply that debt and equity capital are 
substitutes, the cost of debt is an important consideration in the cost of equity. The 
reported regressions also include an interaction term between cost of debt and the conflict 
proxy. It may be the case that conflict has both a direct effect on cost of equity and an 
indirect effect on cost of equity through the cost of debt. Thus, both the level of cost of 
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debt and an interaction term between cost of debt and the conflict proxy are used in 
model specifications.  
 Altman (1968) uses multiple discriminant analysis to construct a bankruptcy 
prediction for firms. This measure has been widely used in the literature as a proxy for 
bankruptcy risk. To predict bankruptcy, Altman uses factors of (1) working capital to 
total assets, (2) retained earnings to total assets, (3) earnings before interest and taxes to 
total assets, (4) market equity to total liabilities, and (5) sales to total assets. Altman’s Z 
scores are calculated using four sets of factors: (1) the original set of factors from the 
1968 paper, (2) the 1996 factors from Begley, Ming, and Watts as reported in Shumway 
(2002), (3) the factors calculated on data from 1962-1983 as reported in Shumway 
(2002), and (4) factors calculated on data from 1962-1992 as reported in Shumway 
(2002).  
Tobin’s Q score is calculated in this paper following Chung and Pruitt (1994), as 
the sum of market value of equity, liquidating value of a firm’s preferred stock, and short 
term debt net of short term assets, all divided by total assets. Book to market is calculated 
as total assets minus total liabilities divided by the market value of the firm. Market value 
of the firm is calculated using CRSP share price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding. Total Assets is taken from the Compustat dataset. Annual values of the 
Fama-French factors SMB, HML, and MKT_RF are retrieved from Kenneth French’s 
online data library. 
In order to validate the empirical proxy, three alternate empirical measures of 
bondholder-shareholder conflict are calculated. First, the ConvPerc measures the total 
amount of a firm’s capital structure that is comprised of convertible debt and convertible 
14 
 
preferred stock. Convertible securities allow an investor to exchange the security for 
another. This feature can allow a debt investor to switch a debt investment for an equity 
investment. If conflict between debtholders and shareholders leads to negative outcomes 
for bondholders (such as in Black, 1976), the debt investor can exercise the conversion 
option. Thus, higher levels of convertible securities represent, at least in part, an 
investor’s attempt to be protected from expected conflict. Thus, higher levels of 
ConvPerc represent higher levels of bondholder-shareholder conflict. The ConvDebt 
measure is calculated as convertible debt divided by total debt. This proxies for conflict 
between bondholders and shareholders similarly to ConvPerc; the percentage of 
convertible securities partially represents an attempt for the investors to protect 
themselves against wealth expropriation from stockholders. CAP1 is calculated by the 
following formula: 
𝐶𝐴𝑃1 =  − |
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔‒ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 − 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
| 
 This measure captures the imbalance in the capital structure between debt and 
equity. This measure is maximized when a firm has roughly the same amount of equity 
and debt. As the capital structure becomes more imbalanced toward debt or equity, one 
type of investor may be able to assert more influence than the other over management. 
With extra influence, it is would be easier for one investor type to opportunistically 
impose wealth expropriation as described in Black (1976). We would expect a proxy for 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders to have a significant, positive correlation 
with each of these measures.  
The first step of the regression is calculated by regressing leverage on bankruptcy 
risk, cost of debt, and common market risk factors. The residuals from this regression 
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then represent the determinants of leverage that are not related to these factors. Thus, we 
have a cleaner measure of the conflict between bondholders and shareholders.  
 To validate the proxy, a battery of tests is run. First, the proxy is tested to see if it 
correlates with other measures that capture bondholder-shareholder conflict. Second, the 
proxy is tested to see if it behaves as expected theoretically with a firm’s cost of equity 
capital. The proxy also is tested to assess its stability across measurements of the 
bankruptcy risk variables in the first-step regression. 
 With this research setup, hypotheses are developed with regard to the proxy. First, 
the proxy must be shown to be valid in measuring conflict. Firms with high conflict could 
find that bondholders are more likely to desire convertible debt. Further, Smith and 
Warner (1979) show that conflict can occur due to the ability of firms to engage in asset 
substitution. A proxy for this investment opportunity set can be measured by a firm’s 
book to market ratio or Tobin’s Q score.  Thus, the first hypothesis can be written as: 
H1a: The proxy for conflict correlates with firm attributes that are affected by 
conflict. 
H1b: The proxy for conflict correlates with firm attributes that affect the level of 
conflict. 
Once the proxy has been validated using these methods, there can be confidence that the 
proxy is not simply the result of econometric problems or model misspecifications. Thus, 
the proxy can be entered into a cost of equity regression with confidence that the 
coefficient estimate is a meaningful representation between the theoretical constructs of 
cost of capital and conflict between bondholders and shareholders. Thus, the second 
hypothesis can be written as: 
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H2: The proxy for conflict will be positively associated with a firm’s cost of 
capital. 
IV. Empirical Results 
 Summary statistics and correlations for variables used in the analysis are reported 
in tables 1 and 2. Table 3 reports the correlations between the proxies for conflict and 
secondary measures of this conflict. Table 4 demonstrates the first step regressions in a 
two-step process. In the first step, leverage is regressed on variables that map other 
constructs besides bondholder-shareholder conflict. The residuals from this regression are 
used as a proxy for bondholder shareholder conflict. Table 5 reports the results from the 
cost of equity regressions. Table 6 reports estimates from a two-step simultaneous 
estimation of cost of equity and debt. Data is Winsorised at the 1% and 99% levels and is 
standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 before analysis. 
 Table 3 presents Spearman and Pearson correlations among four calculations of 
the conflict proxy and Convdebt, Convperc, and CAP1. Each of these measures serves to 
capture effects of conflict between bondholders and shareholders. Convdebt is the 
percentage of debt that is convertible. Convperc is the percentage of the overall capital 
structure that is convertible. CAP1 is a measure of capital structure imbalance (see above 
for the calculation). As expected, the proxies for bondholder shareholder conflict have 
positive, significant correlations with each of the additional measures of conflict. This is 
true for both the Pearson and Spearman correlations. We also see that the four proxies 
(based on the four measurements of Altman’s Z score) are highly correlated. This 
indicates that results from the proxy are not driven simply by a unique first-step model 
variable. We also expect that conflict between investors is increased in high book to 
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market firms. This provides support for the first hypothesis. The proxy is behaving as 
expected in relation to other measures that can capture conflict. 
 In table 4, four calculations of Altman’s Z score are regressed on leverage. Eight 
model specifications are reported: four where Altman Z scores and tax are the only 
regressors and four where the other controls are used. The intuitive sign is retrieved for 
each of the four measures of bankruptcy in both model specifications. As expected, 
bankruptcy risk has a strong, negative association with leverage. The firm’s tax rate also 
takes the expected sign in seven of the eight specifications. Taken together, this is 
evidence that both bankruptcy risk and tax tradeoff are determinants of optimal leverage 
for a firm.  
 Table 5 reports output from cost of equity regressions. Specifications 1 through 3 
are pooled OLS models, where the 3
rd
 is estimated with a time trend. Specification 4 
reports coefficients with clustered standard errors on each firm’s SIC code and over time. 
Specification 5 reports regression estimates with fixed industry and time effects. 
Specification 6 shows the results of Fama-Macbeth regressions with the Newey-West 
adjustment for autocorrelation in standard errors. For the regression, the average cost of 
equity from Gode and Mohanram (2003), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001) is used. The variable used for conflict is the average of four 
proxy calculations based on Altman’s Z from Altman (1968), Begley et al. (1996), and 
two calculations from Shumway (2001).  
 In each specification, the conflict proxy is positive and significant. The proxy has 
the expected relationship with the cost of equity. Conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders is shown to have a significant, positive effect on the cost of equity capital. 
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Considering the wide range of model specifications used, there can be confidence that 
these results are not simply due to model selection. In total, these results give strong 
support to the second hypothesis. 
However, the cost of debt measure does not take the expected sign from the static 
trade off theory. This could be due to several factors besides a rejection of static trade off 
theory. The same factors that drive the cost of equity capital are likely related to the cost 
of debt capital. Thus, higher levels of the cost related to equity capital are related to 
higher levels of debt cost. In an attempt to correct for this problem, table 7 reports a two-
step procedure that estimates the cost of debt and cost of equity simultaneously. The 
coefficient estimate for conflict in the reduced form of the estimated model is positive, 
indicating that conflict increases both the cost of debt and the cost of equity for a firm. 
Taken together, these results show that the conflict proxy is stable across estimation 
environments and supports the first hypothesis.  
As a robustness test, cost of equity calculations are created based on observed 
performance rather than analyst forecasts of performance. Analyst forecasts have been 
noted to be biased (O’Brien 1990). This paper attempts to control for the possibility of 
analyst bias driving results by recalculating the implied cost of capital using actual data. 
Although actual data represent a noisy proxy for expected performance, but would not be 
subject to analyst forecast biases. The results from these regressions are presented in table 
7. The coefficient on the conflict proxy remains positive and significant, but the 
significance and size of the coefficient is somewhat smaller. However, the positive and 
significant sign of the coefficient is stable through multiple estimation environments. 
Taken together, this provides further confirmation regarding the robustness of the proxy. 
19 
 
Another robustness test is conducted on the first-step regression. Econometric 
problems that affect the calculation of the residuals would directly affect the proxy. Thus, 
problems that bias the coefficient estimates may be an issue. Histograms of the residual 
shape show that the data is mound shaped and centered at zero. However, when the 
residuals from the first step are tested for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
method, the hypothesis test strongly rejects the normality of the residual. This affects the 
efficiency of the estimated betas, but does not bias them. Thus, the calculations of 
predicted Ys and residuals are not affected by this potential loss of efficiency. For 
robustness, two additional methods of estimating the first step are included. First, a semi-
parametric method is used where parameters are estimated with the addition of a spline 
curve fitted using a time trend. Second, partial least square estimation of leverage is used. 
The process reduces the dimensionality of the predictors prior to estimation. The results 
were robust to various specifications. Table 8 shows the correlations between the 
residuals from the various estimation methods. The correlations are quite high at over 
90%. Thus, there can be some confidence that the residuals are not driven solely by the 
first-step estimation environment.  
V. Conclusions 
This paper attempts to develop a more accurate empirical measure for conflict 
between bondholders and shareholders. Existing measures of this conflict map to multiple 
constructs, thus making it difficult to ensure that the measured effects from statistical 
tests are due to conflict.  Creating a proxy using a regression approach is an attempt to 
remedy this issue. The proxy exhibits intuitive behavior by correlating positively with 
other variables that measure conflict and by positively correlating with cost of equity in 
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numerous estimation settings. Estimations of this proxy are highly correlated with 
different first-step bankruptcy measures, showing that the proxy is stable and robust to 
some variable selection. Taken together, the tests provide evidence that the proxy 
measures bondholder-shareholder conflict. This measure is robust to multiple estimation 
environments. 
Future research can use this proxy for empirical tests. For example, the 
relationship between accounting information, conflict, and cost of capital is implied by 
the sources of conflict presented in Smith and Warner (1979). Without a reliable proxy, 
testing for the existence of these effects is not possible. Further, this proxy could be used 















BS_LEV_avg 32904 -0.0053138 0.2401096 -0.5546812 0.8296845 
BS_LEV_as2 32904 -0.004519 0.250472 -0.677588 0.8186705 
BS_LEV_as1 32904 -0.004312 0.249431 -0.6108816 0.826851 
BS_LEV_a96 32904 -0.0045786 0.228343 -0.5813971 0.7932677 
BS_LEV_a68 32904 -0.0080851 0.2476243 -0.4442945 0.8985592 
CoE_GM 49260 0.0992494 0.3940845 -0.2606863 3.1919092 
CoE_GLS 42946 0.0974665 0.0891644 0.00007455 0.5 
CoE_CT 38636 0.0933729 0.0963269 0 0.5 
SMB 68099 2.2063229 11.295187 -24.94 27.82 
HML 68099 4.2571442 14.67126 -34.22 39.44 
Mkt_RF 68099 7.6586741 17.2673868 -38.35 32.45 
LIQ1 64024 0.8263485 2.0594142 -0.4366197 82.954023 
TOB_Q 67951 1374.66 2294.06 -52665.09 105032.22 
AT 68099 2267.44 6816.67 7.956 48263 
B2M 33813 0.5996933 0.602154 -0.7360153 3.6285254 
STDEV 68099 17.9784872 12.1400094 0 85 
convperc 67435 0.0232959 0.073612 0 0.4436775 
CAP1 68099 -0.4252319 0.2827877 -1.2065148 -0.0071225 
convdebt1 67428 0.054 0.660 -0.002 108.0252784 
 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in analysis for the paper. Data is gathered from 
Compustat, CRSP, IBES and Kenneth French's online dataset. Cost of Equity measures follow Gode 
and Mohanram (2003), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001). Variable  








Table 2: Correlations between Regression Variables 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 CoE_AVG 
 
0.196 -0.489 -0.168 0.046 -0.017 0.027 0.343 0.293 0.037 
2 BS_LEV_AVG 0.092 
 
-0.482 -0.470 -0.009 -0.011 -0.005 -0.039 0.423 0.124 
3 TOB_Q -0.186 -0.254 
 
0.416 -0.047 -0.006 0.093 -0.712 -0.192 0.142 
4 LIQ1 -0.058 -0.060 0.207 
 
0.012 -0.048 0.003 -0.164 -0.171 0.050 
5 SMB 0.032 -0.010 -0.006 0.010 
 
0.161 0.150 0.003 0.057 -0.015 
6 HML 0.015 0.001 -0.055 -0.007 0.068 
 
-0.318 0.006 -0.049 -0.094 
7 Mkt_RF 0.015 -0.008 0.071 -0.012 0.085 -0.325 
 
-0.099 -0.037 -0.021 
8 B2M 0.069 -0.014 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.007 
 
0.032 -0.111 
9 AT 0.162 0.004 -0.058 -0.054 0.012 -0.022 -0.014 0.000 
 
0.605 
10 STDEV -0.031 0.098 0.031 -0.050 -0.022 -0.068 -0.033 0.001 0.213 
  
This table reports Pearson correlations below the diagonal and Spearman correlations above the diagonal. Variable definitions 








Table 3: Correlations between measurements of bondholder-shareholder conflict 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 BS_LEV_as2 
 
0.986 0.955 0.935 0.988 0.536 0.202 0.192 
2 BS_LEV_as1 0.983 
 
0.936 0.946 0.984 0.552 0.212 0.202 
3 BS_LEV_a96 0.955 0.931 
 
0.948 0.976 0.499 0.189 0.178 
4 BS_LEV_a68 0.917 0.931 0.941 
 
0.972 0.554 0.214 0.203 
5 BS_LEV_avg 0.985 0.980 0.977 0.967 
 
0.544 0.206 0.196 
6 CAP1 0.321 0.341 0.266 0.304 0.312 
 
0.214 0.211 
7 convperc 0.174 0.194 0.172 0.202 0.189 0.092 
 
0.999 
8 convdebt1 0.016 0.028 0.011 0.036 0.024 -0.008 0.281   
This table provides Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. The 
first four variables are proxies for conflict derived from the first-step regression on 
leverage. ConvPerc, Convdebt, and CAP1 are measures that also potentially capture this 
conflict. ConvPerc is calculated as the percent of the firm's overall capital structure that is 
comprised of convertible debt. ConvDebt is the percentage of the firm's debt that is 
convertible. CAP1 is a proxy for imbalance in the capital structure. In all cases, higher 








Table 4: Results from Book Value Leverage on Altman's Z and other covariates 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Altman's Z: 
        1968 -0.317 
   
-0.421 
   
 
0.066 
   
0.169 
   1996 
 
-0.597 





   
0.244 
  Shumway 1 
  
-0.523 
   
-0.533 
 
   
0.227 
   
0.206 
 Shumway 2 
   
-0.606 
   
-0.595 
    
0.263 
   
0.252 
Tax 0.001 0.007 0.017 0.019 -0.001 0.007 0.009 0.012 
 
0.005 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.010 
         Other factors: 
        SMB 
    
0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
     
0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 
HML 
    
-0.145 -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
     
0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 
Mkt_RF 
    
-0.020 -0.006 -0.004 0.001 
     
0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 
AT 
    
0.070 0.066 0.086 0.090 
     
0.010 0.009 0.016 0.018 
LIQ1 
    
-0.090 -0.025 -0.223 -0.178 
     
0.022 0.044 0.034 0.020 
TOB_Q 
    
0.351 0.347 0.059 0.120 
     
0.272 0.243 0.150 0.157 
         
         R-Squared 0.0600 0.2140 0.1636 0.2199 0.1146 0.2688 0.2077 0.2533 
F-Stat 1079.57 4601.43 3305.23 4764.59 543.49 1541.79 1099.51 1422.86 
N 33793 33793 33793 33793 32904 32904 32904 32904 
This table reports results from the first-step regression. The dependent variable is Leverage, 
measured by total liabilities divided by total assets. Altman's Z scores are calculated using the 
original MDA factor loadings (1968), factors calculated by Begley, Ming, and Watts (1996) as 
reported in Shumway (2002), and two sets of factor loadings calculated in Shumway (2002). 
Standard errors are reported in italics. Adjusted R-squared, F-stats, and number of observations is 







Table 5: Regressions of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-Shareholder conflict proxy 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conflict Proxy 0.08 0.045 0.043 0.043 0.053 0.042 
 
0.013 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.007 0.006 
Cost of Debt 0.024 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.04 
  
0.008 0.008 0.01 0.005 0.01 
Interaction 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.007 
  
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.011 
       Controls: 
      STDEV_forecast -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.02 0.001 
  
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
Liquidity 
 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.118 
  
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.023 
Tobins_Q -0.019 -0.02 -0.019 -0.027 0.064 
  
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.016 
ln(Assets) 0.103 0.104 0.105 0.105 0.066 -0.03 
 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.011 
ln(book to market) 0.083 0.071 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.003 
 
0.005 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.006 
Altman's Z 0.012 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.011 0.003 
 
0.013 0.007 0.007 0.01 0.006 0.006 
SMB -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 
  
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.01 
  HML 0.024 0.027 0.027 0.03 
  
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 
  Mkt_Rf 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.05 
  
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.01 
  
       time trend no no yes no no no 
fixed effects no no no no yes no 






Table 5: Regressions of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-Shareholder conflict proxy 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
R-squared 0.1113 0.1151 0.1156 0.1159 0.1684 0.1082 
F-stat 502.9 279.44 240.83 43.93 178.95 - 
N 28055 25678 25678 25581 25097 25678 
This table reports regressions with dependent variable of BS_LEV_avg, the average of 
the implied costs of equity. The conflict proxy is the average of the residuals from four 
first-step regressions.  Models 1-3 are pooled OLS estimates using White's robust 
standard errors. Model 4 reports standard errors clustered on firms' Fama-French industry 
code and year. Model 5 reports fixed effects based on firms' Fama-French industry code 
and year. Model 6 reports the Fama-Macbeth regression with the Newey-West correction 







Table 6: Simultaneous estimation of cost of equity and debt 
  Cost of Equity Cost of Debt 
First step estimation of models: 
 
Conflict Proxy 0.044 0.360 
 
0.006 0.015 











STDEV_forecast -0.003 -0.019 
 
0.003 0.008 
Liquidity 0.002 -0.016 
 
0.003 0.007 
Tobins_Q -0.018 0.030 
 
0.004 0.009 
ln(Assets) 0.100 -0.197 
 
0.004 0.023 
ln(book to market) 0.069 -0.055 
 
0.003 0.017 
Altman's Z 0.066 -0.371 
 
0.006 0.015 
SMB -0.004 0.010 
 
0.003 0.006 
HML 0.025 -0.041 
 
0.003 0.008 





R-squared 0.1139 0.0515 
F-stat 299.97 126.8 




   Table 6: Simultaneous estimation of cost of equity and debt 
  Cost of Equity Cost of Debt 
Reduced Form: 
 





STDEV_forecast -0.008 -0.048 
Liquidity 0.000 -0.015 
Tobins_Q -0.018 -0.002 
ln(Assets) 0.094 -0.037 
ln(book to market) 0.079 0.086 
Altman's Z 0.027 -0.323 
SMB -0.003 0.003 
HML 0.026 0.007 
Mkt_Rf 0.051 0.011 
This table reports regression results from a simultaneous regression of cost of equity 
and cost of debt. The cost of equity used in this regression is the average of the implied 
cost of capital scores from Gode and Mohanram (2003), Claus and Thomas (2001), and 
Gebhardt et al. (2001). The procedure reports the reduced form estimates in the second 







Table 7: Regressions of Alternate Calculation of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-
Shareholder conflict proxy 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conflict Proxy 0.065 0.045 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.042 
 
0.012 0.013 0.013 0.019 0.01 0.013 
Cost of Debt 0.011 0.066 0.011 0.011 0.031 
  










       Controls: 
      Liquidity -0.027 -0.239 -0.24 -0.244 -0.243 -0.369 
 
0.008 0.054 0.055 0.075 0.038 0.242 
Tobins_Q -0.173 -0.267 -0.269 -0.266 -0.266 -0.254 
 
0.028 0.031 0.031 0.037 0.018 0.066 
ln(Assets) -0.009 -0.037 -0.037 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
 
0.014 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.011 0.042 
ln(book to market) 0.003 -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 
 
0.022 0.024 0.024 0.028 0.01 0 
Altman's Z 0.148 0.217 0.217 0.218 0.217 0.195 
 
0.036 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.016 0.054 
SMB -0.014 -0.01 -0.01 -0.013 
  
 
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.013 
  HML -0.043 -0.045 -0.045 -0.042 
  
 
0.01 0.011 0.011 0.011 
  Mkt_Rf -0.028 -0.03 -0.03 -0.029 
  
 
0.009 0.01 0.01 0.011 
  
       time trend no yes yes no no no 
fixed effects no no no no yes no 




Table 7: Regressions of Alternate Calculation of Cost of Equity on Bondholder-
Shareholder conflict proxy 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
R-squared 0.0475 0.0573 0.0574 0.0581 0.0341 0.05295 
F-stat 58.65 56.17 51.66 16.93 58.68 40.52 
N 11560 9990 9990 9990 9990 9990 
This table reports regressions with dependent variable of BS_LEV_avg, the average of 
the implied costs of equity. The conflict proxy is the average of the residuals from four 
first-step regressions.  Models 1-3 are pooled OLS estimates using White's robust 
standard errors. Model 4 reports standard errors clustered on firms' 4 digit SIC code and 
year. Model 5 reports fixed effects based on firms' 4 digit SIC code and year. Model 6 
reports Fama-Macbeth regressions. Cost of equity equations presented are calculated 
using actual observed future performance rather than analyst forecasts for Gode and 
Mohanram (2003) Cost of Equity. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
BONDHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT, ACCRUALS QUALITY, AND 
THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL 
I. Introduction 
Earnings quality has been a topic in business research for decades. Dechow et al. 
(2010) note an instance of this construct being mentioned as early as 1934 by Graham 
and Dodd. They also note that the definition of the construct of earnings quality has 
changed over these years. Dechow et al (2010) quote SFAC No. 1 in defining earnings 
quality by “provid[ing] more information about the features of a firm’s financial 
performance that are relevant to a specific decision made by a specific decision-maker” 
(Dechow et al. 2010). 
As early as Ball and Brown (1968), accounting information has been shown to 
contain important information for securities markets. Because financial statement 
information may affect stock price, cost of capital, and their executive compensation, 
managers have incentives to report higher earnings. Managers desire to avoid reporting 
losses and meet earnings targets. This can encourage managers to perform well; 
contingent contracts are one solution to the Principal-Agent problem from Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). On the other hand, this same pressure might encourage managers to 
manipulate earnings numbers. If firm performance has been insufficient to meet these 
goals, a manager will have incentive to find other ways to meet performance benchmarks. 
When earnings numbers are manipulated so that they are no longer reflect underlying 
performance, these earnings are of lower quality.  
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One way that managers can manipulate earnings numbers is through accruals. In 
the preparation of financial statements, managers have some flexibility in how to report 
of certain items. A manager could opportunistically decide to make reporting choices 
based on their effect on income rather than as an attempt to faithfully report the financial 
position of the firm. Francis et al. (2005) find that discretionary accruals increase a firm’s 
cost of capital. The direct manipulation of earnings numbers reduces the quality of 
reported earnings.  
Dechow et al. (2010) break earnings quality into three categories: “properties of 
earnings, investor responsiveness to earnings, and external indicators of earnings 
misstatements” (Dechow et al. 2010). In the first category of properties of earnings, 
Francis et al. (2005) demonstrate that the most important attributes fall under the category 
of accounting-based earnings attributes. Of the accounting-based earnings attributes, 
Accruals quality is shown to be the most important of these. Francis et al. (2004) 
demonstrate that the firm’s choice of accounting can affect its cost of capital. Francis et 
al. (2005) deconstruct accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary amounts. The 
authors find that the non-discretionary portion of these earnings has a greater effect on 
cost of capital, but that discretionary accruals have a separate, positive effect on cost of 
capital. 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Models  
The accruals portion of earnings quality has been researched in accounting for 
years. Early work by DeAngelo (1986) portrays current nondiscretionary accruals as the 
total accruals from the previous period. Sloan (1996) uses a model wherein earnings are 
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estimated by previous periods’ accruals and cash flows. The coefficient on accruals 
represents the persistence of accruals in earnings, mirroring the idea of earnings 
persistence. The Jones model (Jones, 1991) relates accruals to assets and revenues. To the 
extent that accruals are captured by assets and revenues, they are considered non-
discretionary. The Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) extends this framework 
to include changes in accounts receivable. These frameworks provide researchers with a 
method to distinguish accruals that are related to a firm’s underlying characteristics from 
those accruals that are under managerial control. Francis et al. (2005) find that market 
prices assign less weight to these discretionary accruals. Managers can manipulate 
discretionary accruals more easily, thus making them less value-relevant. 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) represent accrual quality by modeling working capital 
on previous period, current period, and future period cash flows. High quality accruals 
will map well to changes in working capital. Using this logic, the proxy for accruals 
quality is the standard deviation of the residual from this regression.  
Previous Empirical Work 
Accruals quality has been shown to relate to cost of equity and related constructs. 
Francis et al. (2004) show that accruals quality exhibits the greatest effect on cost of 
equity among earnings quality measures. They test this notion by comparing the cost of 
equity between high earnings quality firms and low earnings quality firms. Francis et al. 
(2005) show that both discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals have an effect on the 
cost of capital. Francis et al. (2008) show that voluntary disclosures lead to reduced cost 
of capital and that this effect is stronger among firms with lower earnings quality. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2013) shows that accrual quality is related to information asymmetry. 
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They find that firms with lower accrual quality have increased levels of the adverse 
selection component of trading costs.  
  The first paper in this dissertation has shown how conflict between bondholders 
and shareholders can affect the cost of capital for a firm. We also have seen literature 
(Francis et al. 2005, for example) that shows that accruals quality is an important 
determinant for a firm’s cost of capital. Further, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) find that 
earnings quality is negatively associated with information asymmetry. 
III. Hypotheses 
Consider a manager optimizing the level of accruals with respect to cost of 
capital. This manager might recognize that lower accrual quality is related to higher cost 
of equity. However, accrual quality may affect the level of investor conflict in a firm. 
This could happen due to changes in the level of information asymmetry for a particular 
firm. For example, one point of conflict between bondholders and shareholders is asset 
substitution. This happens when a firm takes on debt and subsequently increases the level 
of risk in its projects. If a firm has lower quality information, rational investors will price 
their inability to determine whether a firm has such projects available to them. This 
follows Myers’ analytical construction of a firm, where a significant portion of firm value 
is the firm’s future projects (Myers, 1977).  
 Francis et al. (2005) describe earnings quality as relating to the information 
environment of a firm. Lobo et al. (2012) find that analyst coverage increases as accrual 
quality decreases. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) show that earnings quality is negatively 
associated with information asymmetry. Thus, changing the level of earnings quality 
(engaging in low-quality earnings opportunistically) may affect the level of conflict 
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between investor types by affecting the information environment for investors. Thus, 
earnings quality has a direct effect on a firm’s cost of equity and an indirect effect 
through its effect on conflict between investors. This yields the first hypothesis, stated in 
the null: 
H1a: Accrual quality affects cost of equity directly. 
H1b: Accrual quality affects cost of equity indirectly through its effect on 
Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. 
In testing accruals quality, Francis et al. (2005) break accruals down into 
discretionary accrual and innate accrual quality. In their paper, Francis et al. are able to 
effectively identify the portion of accruals that are directly under the control of the 
manager. They find that non-discretionary accruals have a larger effect on cost of equity 
than discretionary accruals. Both effects are interpreted to represent an element of the 
firm’s information environment. Conflict between bondholders and shareholders also is 
partly determined by the information environment for the firm. Smith and Warner (1979) 
identify underinvestment and asset substitution as sources of conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders. These constructs are observed by investors through the 
firm’s individual information environment. Since discretionary accruals are part of the 
firm’s information environment, the manager chooses discretionary accrual quality based 
on its direct effect on cost of equity (see Francis et al., 2005) and its indirect effect on 
cost of equity through conflict between bondholders and shareholders. Francis et al. 
(2005) find that the discretionary portion has a smaller coefficient than the non-
discretionary portion. However, the discretionary portion represents the portion that 
management can control directly. Further, Francis et al. (2005) find that both low 
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discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals quality have a positive, significant effect on 
cost of equity. Thus, both parts of the accruals quality have a significant effect on the cost 
of capital. This yields the second pair of hypotheses, stated in the null: 
H2a: Discretionary accrual quality affects cost of equity directly. 
H2b: Discretionary accrual quality affects cost of equity indirectly through 
bondholder-shareholder conflict. 
Both accrual quality and discretionary accrual quality are part of the earnings 
quality of a firm (Francis et al. 2005) and thus are a significant part of the information 
environment of a firm. Both bondholders and shareholders use financial information to 
inform their decisions with respect to investment. Rational investors will price the 
information problem in the cost of equity regression as hypothesized above. However, 
poor information quality will make it difficult for debt investors to analyze the extent to 
which their investment would put them in conflict with equity investors (and vice versa). 
For example, one source of conflict in Smith and Warner (1979) is dividend policy. The 
dividend payout ratio is based on a firm’s net income. Lower quality earnings reporting 
will mean that investors will place lower value on earnings in determining performance, 
but also will place lower value on earnings in determining the level of conflict with other 
investors. Ceteris paribus, this will increase the level of conflict between bondholders 
and shareholders. Thus, hypothesis 3 is given as: 
H3a: Accrual quality has a positive relation to bondholder-shareholder conflict. 





 The theory that accrual quality maps to cost of equity directly and indirectly 
through conflict is a test for a theoretical mediation effect. This effect can be tested 
empirically using the Sobel test. The Sobel test statistic is calculated using (a) regressions 
of the independent variable (in this case, accruals quality) on the mediator (bondholder-
shareholder conflict) and (b) the independent variable and mediator on the dependent 
variable (cost of equity). The coefficients and standard errors from these regressions are 
used to construct the Sobel test for the statistical significance of the mediation effect. The 
Sobel test statistic is given by: 
𝑧𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑙 =  
𝑎 ∗ 𝑏
√(𝑏2𝑠𝑎2 + 𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2 + 𝑠𝑎2 ∗ 𝑠𝑏
2)
 
In this setup, a is the estimated coefficient for accruals quality on the regression 
on conflict, b is the estimated coefficient for conflict on the regression on cost of equity, 
and sa and sb are the standard error of the estimated coefficients on a and b, respectively. 
This test statistic is normally distributed, so significance is found in the rejection regions 
of ±1.96. Preacher and Hayes (2004) provide code for testing for mediation, including the 
Sobel test for the significance of a mediation effect. With this, we can test for mediation 
in the following cost of equity regression: 




Where C is the cost of capital, AQ is the measure of accruals quality, Con is the measure 
of conflict between bondholders and shareholders, and the xi are relevant control 
variables. The calculated value of the Sobel tests for the significance of the mediation 
effect of bondholder-shareholder conflict in the relation between accrual quality and the 
38 
 
cost of equity. The output from this regression method shows the level and significance 
of the effect of accruals quality directly on cost of capital and the effect of accruals 
quality on cost of capital indirectly through bondholder-shareholder conflict. 
 Hypotheses H2a and H2b are tested using the same regression setup. Instead of 
testing total accruals, the accrual quality measure is dichotomized into its discretionary 
and non-discretionary components. Similarly, the model for testing these hypotheses is 
given as:  
𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝐴𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=3
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
In this model, AQ is replaced by discretionary accruals. Similar to testing H1, their direct 
effects on cost of capital and their indirect effects on cost of capital through conflict is 
assessed from the Preacher and Hayes method (Preacher and Hayes, 2004). The direct 
effect is the coefficient from the cost of equity regression β1 and the indirect effect’s 
significance is measured with the Sobel test. 
  The expectation is that conflict is increased by earnings management. Smith and 
Warner (1979) note that bondholder-shareholder conflict exists over asset substitution, 
underinvestment, dividend policy, and claim dilution. Of these, three are based on a 
company’s net earnings from the company’s financial statements. The company’s 
dividend policy would likely be analyzed using the dividend payout ratio, calculated by 
dividends paid divided by net income. Thus, if a firm manipulates earnings upward, they 
can appear to have a smaller payout ratio. Asset substitution could be detected by 
increased variation in firm profitability. If a firm uses debt to invest in risk assets, the 
firm’s income may become more variable after the investment. Underinvestment could be 
detected by changes in firm income. If the firm is rejecting more positive NPV projects 
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than comparable firms that do not have conflict, their income would be lower on average. 
The dividend policy for a firm would likely be measured by its dividend payout ratio, 
which uses net income directly. If firms produce lower quality financial statements, 
investors will not be sure that company information reflects their level of investment. 
This uncertainty will be priced in the form of increased costs to the firms from these 
investors. 
V. Variables 
The dependent variable in the main regression is the cost of equity. This variable 
is calculated as the average of the Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), and 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) cost of equity metrics. The equations for each of these cost 
of equity metrics are presented in Appendix B.  
Bondholder-shareholder conflict is measured using the two-step method in 
Njoroge et al. (2015). The residuals from the regression of Leverage on determinants of 
optimal leverage represent the level of conflict between bondholders and shareholders. 
The calculation of this proxy is achieved with four calculations of Altman’s Z: the factors 
from the original Altman’s 1968 paper, factors calculated in the Begley et al. (1996), and 
two calculations provided in Shumway (2002).  
Accrual Quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et 
al. (2004). In both cases, accrual quality is measured as the standard deviation of a ten-
year window of regressions. The equation used for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) is 
given by: 




Where ∆WCt is the change in working capital from t-1 to t and CFOt is the cash flow 
from operations at time t. This regression is performed for the ten-year window t-9 to t 
for each firm. The standard deviation of the error term is the measure of accrual quality 
for the firm at time t. Similarly, Francis et al. (2004) employ a regression method based 
on the equation: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡









+  𝜀𝑡 
Where TCAt is the firm’s total current accruals, CFOt is the Cash flow from operations at 
time t, and Assetst is the average of total assets at t-1 and t. The measure for accruals 
quality at time t is the standard deviation of the error term for a ten-year window t-9 to t. 
 Francis et al. (2005, pg. 305) provide two methods to deconstruct accruals quality 
into its discretionary and innate components. The first method is to use a regression 
where the dependent variable is firm accrual quality and the independent variables are the 
innate determinants of accrual quality. Innate determinants of accrual quality include the 
firm’s operating cycle (OP_CYCLE), the natural log of firm assets (LNAT), the standard 
deviation of Cash flow from Operations and Sales (STD_SALE and STD_CFO), and a 
dummy variable that captures whether the firm had negative earnings in that period 
(NEG_EARN). The residuals from this regression represent the portion of accruals that 
are not innate, thus capturing discretionary accruals. The second method uses the 
standard accruals quality metric, but includes determinants of innate accrual quality in the 
cost of equity regression. With this method, the coefficient on accrual quality is 
interpreted as the effect of discretionary accruals on the firm’s cost of equity. For each 
measure of accrual quality or discretionary accrual quality, the variable is transformed 




Results from the Preacher-Hayes method for regressing accruals quality, bondholder-
shareholder conflict, and controls on cost of equity are presented in the table 2. The table 
reports the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and the Francis et al. (2004) accrual quality along 
with the average of the two measures. Each measure for accrual quality has a positive, 
significant relationship with cost of equity. This relationship supports hypothesis 1a. The 
Sobel test is positive and significant for each formulation of accrual quality. Thus, 
hypothesis 1b also is supported.  
Table 3 reports the results from regressing discretionary accrual quality on cost of 
equity using the control variable method from Francis et al. (2005). The results indicate 
significance for each of the direct effect coefficients, supporting hypothesis 2a. The Sobel 
test for each of the indirect effects through bondholder-shareholder conflict also is 
significant, supporting hypothesis 2b. 
Table 4 reports the results from regressing discretionary accrual quality on cost of 
equity using the regression method for calculating discretionary accrual quality from 
Francis et al. (2005). The direct effect still is positive, but is somewhat weaker using this 
method. The Francis et al. (2005) and the average of the two methods are positive and 
significant. The calculation of discretionary accrual quality based on Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) is positive, but not significant. The Sobel test indicates that all three have a 
positive, significant indirect effect on cost of equity through bondholder-shareholder 
conflict. Taken together, tables 3 and 4 provide support for the notion that discretionary 
accrual quality has a direct effect on the cost of equity capital and that discretionary 
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accrual quality has an indirect effect on cost of capital through bondholder-shareholder 
conflict. 
Table 5 reports regressions of bondholder-shareholder conflict on Accruals Quality 
and Discretionary Accruals Quality. Models 1 and 2 test overall accruals quality, where 
models 3 and 4 test discretionary accruals quality. In each model, the accrual quality and 
discretionary accruals quality measures have a positive, significant coefficient. Taken 
together, these results support hypothesis 3a and 3b. Also, the Sobel test values calculated 
in table 2 are positive, providing further evidence that the relationship between accruals 
quality and conflict are positive, which supports hypothesis 3a. Similarly, the Sobel test 
values in table 3 and 4 are positive and significant, further supporting hypothesis 3b. 
VII. Conclusions 
The positive relationship between accrual quality and cost of capital has been 
established in previous research. Investors charge a premium for firms that provide low-
quality earnings information because investors use earnings information to decide on 
their investment in a firm. This paper is designed to discover another avenue by which 
accrual quality affects the cost of equity; namely, the indirect effect of accrual quality on 
cost of equity through bondholder-shareholder conflict.  
Whether this effect is present in discretionary accruals quality also is tested. Test 
results reported in the paper support the notion that accruals quality has both a direct 
effect on cost of equity and an indirect effect on cost of equity through bondholder-
shareholder conflict. Further, evidence is shown that this effect is present in discretionary 
accrual quality. Taken together, these results support the idea that accrual quality has 
significant secondary effects on a firm’s cost of equity.  
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This paper serves to further elucidate the role of accrual quality in the cost of equity 
of a firm. The direct effect of accruals quality on cost of equity had been established in 
previous literature. The indirect effect of accruals quality on cost of equity through 
bondholder-shareholder conflict is supported here. More generally, we find that the 
information environment of a firm has an effect on the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders and that this effect serves to increase costs to the firm. This provides further 
empirical support to existing theory regarding bondholder-shareholder conflict. The 
theoretical sources of conflict between bondholders and shareholders in Smith and 
Warner (1979) require both equity and debt investors to evaluate the performance of the 
firm. One of the most important performance evaluation tools is the financial statements. 
Both types of investors use financial statement information to evaluate the extent to 
which the firm is engaging in the sources of conflict reported in Smith and Warner 
(1979): asset substitution, overinvestment, dividend policy, and claim dilution. Reducing 
the quality of the financial statements with poor accruals quality not only affects the 
information environment for stockholders, but for bondholders as well. The results here 
provide empirical support for the nature and consequences of conflict between 
bondholders and shareholders.  
In more general terms, this research provides insight into ways that the information 
environment and agency problems affect a firm’s cost of capital. An indirect effect 
through the agency conflict between bondholders and shareholders is theorized in 















R_AQ_D 39604 4.489 2.919728 0 9 
R_AQ_F 39601 4.500 2.920099 0 9 
R_DISC_D 39222 4.500 2.872265 0 9 
R_DISC_F 39219 4.500 2.872265 0 9 
BS_LEV_avg 32904 -0.005 0.24011 -0.5546812 0.8296845 
CoE_GM 49260 0.099 0.394085 -0.2606863 3.1919092 
CoE_GLS 42946 0.097 0.089164 0.00007455 0.5 
CoE_CT 38636 0.093 0.096327 0 0.5 
SMB 68099 2.206 11.29519 -24.94 27.82 
HML 68099 4.257 14.67126 -34.22 39.44 
Mkt_RF 68099 7.659 17.26739 -38.35 32.45 
LIQ1 64024 0.826 2.059414 -0.4366197 82.954023 
TOB_Q 67951 1374.660 2294.06 -52665.09 105032.22 
AT 68099 2267.440 6816.67 7.956 48263 
B2M 33813 0.600 0.602154 -0.7360153 3.6285254 
STDEV 68099 17.978 12.14001 0 85 
STD_CFO 65805 90.19033 497.2884 0 39301.22 
STD_SALE 65805 533.9813 2733.71 0 113894.81 
IN_INT 68099 0.147952 0.297058 0 23.9799331 
CAP_INT 68072 0.305098 0.235772 0 0.9998063 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in analysis for the paper. 
Data is gathered from Compustat, CRSP, IBES and Kenneth French's online 
dataset. Cost of Equity measures follow Gode and Mohanram (2003), Claus and 
Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001). Variable definitions are reported in 
Appendix A. 
 







 Table 2: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Accruals Quality 





Accrual Quality Measures: 
     R_AQ_D 0.0099 0.0016 
    R_AQ_F 
  
0.0106 0.0015 
  A_AQ 
    
0.0108 0.0016 
       Conflict 0.0755 0.0048 0.0754 0.0048 0.0753 0.0048 
       Controls: 
      Mkt_RF 0.0865 0.0042 0.0865 0.0042 0.0865 0.0042 
SMB -0.0150 0.0038 -0.0150 0.0038 -0.0150 0.0038 
HML 0.0361 0.0043 0.0361 0.0043 0.0361 0.0043 
LNAT 0.0594 0.0064 0.0586 0.0064 0.0579 0.0064 
STDEV 0.0053 0.0053 0.0057 0.0053 0.0058 0.0053 
LNB2M 0.1470 0.0044 0.1466 0.0044 0.1466 0.0044 
       Sobel Test 0.0026 0.0003 0.0028 0.0003 0.0028 0.0003 





 R-Squared 11.60   11.64   11.63   
This table presents regressions on Cost of Equity with regressors of Accrual Quality, 
Bondholder-Shareholder conflict, and controls for firm size, investment set, and 
economic conditions. Accrual Quality is measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
(AQ_D), and the Francis et al. (2004) (AQ_F) methods. Estimated coefficients using the 
average of the two Accrual Quality measures (A_AQ) in the Cost of Equity regressions 
are reported in the fifth and sixth columns. The Sobel test is conducted for the indirect 
effect of Accrual quality on the Cost of Equity through Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. 














Table 3: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Discretionary Accruals 
Quality and Conflict 
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
Accrual Quality Measures   
 
  
  R_DISC_D 0.0039 0.0017 
    R_DISC_F 
  
0.0051 0.0017 
  A_DAQ 
    
0.0048 0.0018 
       Conflict 0.0598 0.0051 0.0596 0.0051 0.0597 0.0051 
       Controls: 
      Mkt_RF 0.0856 0.0042 0.0856 0.0042 0.0856 0.0042 
SMB -0.017 0.0038 -0.017 0.0038 -0.017 0.0038 
HML 0.0352 0.0043 0.0352 0.0043 0.0352 0.0043 
LNAT 0.1159 0.0082 0.114 0.0082 0.1144 0.0082 
STDEV 0.0255 0.0057 0.0258 0.0057 0.0257 0.0057 
LNB2M 0.1305 0.0046 0.1303 0.0046 0.1304 0.0046 
IN_INT 0.0283 0.0156 0.0291 0.0156 0.0288 0.0156 
CAP_INT 0.1204 0.0197 0.1166 0.0195 0.1172 0.0197 
LIQ1 -0.0061 0.0039 -0.0058 0.0039 -0.0059 0.0039 
NUMEST -0.0109 0.0009 -0.0108 0.0009 -0.0108 0.0009 
OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NEG_EARN 0.0254 0.0101 0.0262 0.0101 0.0260 0.0101 
STD_CFO 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 






Table 3: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Discretionary Accruals 






 R-Square 12.73   12.75   12.74 
 This table presents regressions on Cost of Equity with regressors of Discretionary 
Accrual Quality, Bondholder-Shareholder conflict, and controls for firm size, investment 
set, and economic conditions. Discretionary Accrual Quality is calculated following the 
methodology used in Francis et al. (2004) on both the Dechow and Dichev (2002) and the 
Francis et al. (2004) Accruals Quality metrics. Estimated coefficients using the average 
of the two Accrual Quality measures in the Cost of Equity regressions are reported in the 
fifth and sixth columns. The Sobel test is conducted for the indirect effect of Accrual 
quality on the Cost of Equity through Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. The F-Stat and 









Table 4: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Regression-Based 
Discretionary Accruals Quality and Conflict 
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
Accrual Quality Measure     
 
  
 R_DISC_D 0.0008 0.0018 
    R_DISC_F 
  
0.0042 0.0016 
  A_DAQ 
    
0.0028 0.0017 
       Conflict 0.0805 0.0049 0.0793 0.0049 0.0799 0.0049 
       Controls: 
      Mkt_RF 0.0872 0.0042 0.0872 0.0042 0.0872 0.0042 
SMB -0.016 0.0038 -0.0161 0.0038 -0.016 0.0038 
HML 0.0355 0.0043 0.0356 0.0043 0.0356 0.0043 
LNAT 0.0779 0.0063 0.0815 0.006 0.0804 0.0062 
STDEV 0.0011 0.0054 0.0025 0.0054 0.0019 0.0054 
LNB2M 0.1486 0.0045 0.1465 0.0045 0.1474 0.0045 
       Sobel Test 0.0027 0.0003 0.0029 0.0003 0.003 0.0003 





 R-Square 11.28   11.31 
 
11.29 
 This table presents regressions on Cost of Equity with regressors of Discretionary 
Accrual Quality, Bondholder-Shareholder conflict, and controls for firm size, investment 
set, and economic conditions. Discretionary Accrual Quality is calculated following the 
two-step regression methodology used in Francis et al. (2004) on both the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and the Francis et al. (2004) Accruals Quality metrics. Estimated 
coefficients using the average of the two Accrual Quality measures in the Cost of Equity 
regressions are reported in the fifth and sixth columns. The Sobel test is conducted for the 
indirect effect of Accrual quality on the Cost of Equity through Bondholder-Shareholder 
conflict. The F-Stat and R-Squared for the Cost of Equity regression are reported below 











Table 5: Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict regressions with measures of Accruals 
Quality 
     
Panel A         
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
A_AQ 0.0957 0.0020 0.0580 0.0022 
     Controls: 



















   STD_SALE 
   OP_CYCLE 
   NEG_EARN 
   CAP_INT 
   IN_INT 
    
     F-Stat 2218.93 
 
616.92 
 R-Squared 8.62 
 
17.45 




     Panel B         
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
A_DAQ 0.0431 0.0023 0.0603 0.0024 
     Controls: 
   SMB -0.0085 0.0053 -0.0056 0.0055 
HML -0.0136 0.0057 -0.0131 0.0059 
MKT_RF -0.0358 0.0054 -0.0376 0.0056 
LNAT 0.4332 0.0088 0.4860 0.0077 
LNB2M -0.2007 0.0059 -0.1900 0.0061 
STDEV -0.1585 0.0067 -0.1415 0.0069 
STD_CFO -0.0001 0.0000 
  STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 
  OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 
  NEG_EARN 0.2832 0.0128 
  CAP_INT 0.4767 0.0259 
  IN_INT 0.1192 0.0198 
  
     F-Stat 489.10 
 
595.39 
 R-Squared 22.88 
 
17.11 
 N 23040   23045   
This table presents regressions on Bondholder-Shareholder conflict with regressors of 
Accrual Quality and controls for models 1 through 3 and Discretionary Accruals Quality 
for model 4. Accrual Quality is measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002), and the 
Francis et al. (2004) methods. Estimated coefficients using the average of the two 
Accrual Quality measures in the Cost of Equity regressions are reported in models 1 
through 3. Models 2 through 4 are estimated with a time trend. Discretionary Accrual 
Quality is the average of the Francis et al. (2005) regression method for Discretionary 






THE EFFECTS OF REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ON COST OF CAPITAL 
THROUGH BONDHOLDER-SHAREHOLDER CONFLICT 
 
I. Introduction 
  Xu et al. (2007) quote Schipper (1989) as portraying earnings management as “a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of 
obtaining some private gain” (Xu et al. 2007). This includes many behaviors, as the 
intended financial reporting outcome will differ based on the manager’s situation. Real 
earnings management (REM) might be used to maximize profits, beat the zero earnings 
benchmark, meet earnings expectations, and meet EPS expectations, among others. 
Evidence of this behavior has been noted in the literature for decades. Managers are 
incented to manage earnings to influence the firm’s cost of capital, stock price, and their 
own compensation. When a firm is not performing well, a manager will be pressured to 
find a way to report positive earnings. Badertscher (2011) suggests that managers might 
engage in accruals manipulation, real earnings management, and fraudulent activity when 
under this pressure.  
Roychowdhury’s (2006) seminal research on real earnings management provides 
insight into the phenomenon of managerial manipulation of business activities to 
influence reported earnings. REM encompasses a wide range of behaviors that relate to 
earnings management. Specifically, managers use REM in order to avoid reporting 
losses. Roychowdhury (2006) also provides measurement criteria for identifying firms 
that are under this pressure. He examines firms that narrowly meet or beat the zero-
earnings benchmark to identify firms that are likely to be using earnings management. 
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Badertscher (2011) and Zang (2012) investigate the mechanisms that lead managers to 
use one type of earnings management over another. 
Badertscher (2011) postulates that managers select an earnings management 
method based on using GAAP-acceptable earnings management before using non-GAAP 
methods. Zang (2012) shows that REM and accruals-based earnings managements are 
substitutes. If managers need to manipulate earnings toward a particular goal 
(smoothness, beating zero earnings, meeting EPS or earnings predictions), then the 
manager selects not only how much to manipulate earnings, but also which methods to 
use to manipulate earnings. Zang (2012) shows that managers select a method to manage 
earnings based on their relative costliness.  
Earnings management can affect the conflict between bondholders and 
shareholders. Earnings quality affects the information environment of the firm. 
Bondholders are more sensitive to variability in earnings, thus making them more 
sensitive to increases in information uncertainty. Accordingly, changes in the information 
environment can theoretically lead to increased conflict between investor groups. In 
Njoroge et al. (2015), the link between conflict and cost of capital is demonstrated to be 
positive and significant. Thus, earnings management that increases conflict between 
investor groups can be hypothesized to increase a firm’s cost of capital. Taken together, 
the unanswered empirical questions regarding the effects of REM on cost of capital 
through investor conflict can have both theoretical and economic significance. 
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development. 
 The manipulation of real activities to achieve earnings targets has been studied in 
accounting for decades. Xu et al. (2007) outline activities that managers can manipulate, 
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summarized as: discretionary expenditures, production, inventory and sales, sales of 
long-term assets, structuring of investing transactions, stock repurchases, stock options, 
financial instruments, and structuring of financial transactions. The construct of real 
earnings management is not necessarily the reduction of expenses; a prudent manager 
would reduce unnecessary expenses and increase profits. Thus, decision models are 
needed to identify which activities should be classified as real earnings management. 
 The nature of research and development costs makes them especially susceptible 
to manipulation: they are completely under management’s control, the effects from 
suboptimal research and development costs are not realized until future periods, and they 
constitute a significant portion of some firms’ expenses. Thus, manipulation of research 
and development costs can have significant effects on current income. Baber et al. (1991) 
find that research and development costs are lower when they would negatively affect 
firm profits. Dechow and Sloan (1991) finds that when a CEO is in the last year of 
employment, research and development spending is lower. This is attributed to the CEO 
gaining the benefits of achieving higher profits without having to incur the costs of lower 
profits in the future. Perry and Grinaker (1994) and Bange and DeBondt (1998) use 
models to estimated expected research and development costs. Perry and Grinaker (1994) 
develop a model in which the estimated values from the models are compared to actual 
research and development costs, yielding the portion of the cost that is due to 
manipulation. The model uses previous period research and development costs and 
incorporates other factors including capital expenditures, income from core operations, 
and macroeconomic indicators. Bange and DeBondt (1998) calculate expected research 
and development costs by applying growth rates to previous period research and 
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development costs. They find that firms reduce research and development when they fall 
short of earnings forecasts. Roychowdhury (2006) reinforces this finding, showing that 
firms engage in real activity manipulation to meet analyst forecasts and to avoid reporting 
losses. Roychowdhury (2006) shows this is true for discretionary expenses, production, 
and the offering of sales discounts.  
 The goal of a manager engaging in earnings manipulation might be to report 
higher earnings. This may be to avoid reporting losses or to meet analyst forecasts 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Managers can manipulate accruals or real activities in order to 
achieve this goal. Badertscher (2011) shows that firms use earnings management to 
maintain levels of overvaluation of equity. Badertscher shows that firms use accruals 
manipulation, real activities manipulation, and non-GAAP manipulation to maintain 
overvaluation. Further, managers choose manipulations in the order of the ease of their 
implementation and potential consequences of the manipulation. Badertscher (2011) 
notes that these earnings manipulations are chosen in order of: accruals manipulation, 
real earnings management, and non-GAAP or fraudulent activity. Accruals manipulation 
is the least costly as it only requires changes in accounting. Real earnings management 
requires a firm to depart from optimal operating decisions in order to report positive 
earnings. Non-GAAP manipulations require the firm to engage in fraud, which can lead 
to significant firm-level and individual consequences for the manager. Zang (2012) 
identifies the substitution effect for accruals management and real earnings management 
and finds that there is greater real earnings management when accrual manipulation is 
difficult for firms. High-quality auditors, heightened scrutiny of accounting practice, 
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previous period accounting choices, and firm operating cycle length affect the ease at 
which a firm can manage its accruals.  
Smith and Warner (1979) identify four sources of conflict between bondholders 
and shareholders: dividend policy, claim dilution, asset substitution, and 
underinvestment. Myers (1977) identifies that some of this conflict is due to investment 
behavior of the firm. He finds that shareholders may reject positive net present value 
projects because the benefits accrue to bondholders rather than shareholders. Smith and 
Warner (1979) identify asset substitution as replacing low-risk projects with high risk 
projects. Due to these tradeoffs, there can be pressure on managers to act to reduce firm 
value. Similarly, real earnings management represents possible reductions in firm value 
in order to achieve earnings targets. Thus, the manager that engages in real earnings 
management may affect the firm’s cost of capital in two ways: directly through affecting 
the value of the firm and indirectly through affecting the conflict between bondholders 
and shareholders. Hence, the first hypothesis is given as: 
H1a: Real earnings management affects the firm’s cost of capital directly. 
H1b: Real earnings management affects the firm’s cost of capital indirectly 
through firm level conflict between bondholders and shareholders. 
Roychowdhury (2006) identifies real earnings management through three 
avenues: price discounts, overproduction, and reductions in discretionary expenses. 
However, managers also can manipulate earnings through accruals. Zang (2012) 
demonstrates that accruals management and real earnings management are substitutes. 
Zang finds that, when accrual management is more difficult to implement, managers are 
more likely to use real earnings management instead of accruals management. This 
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optimization occurs due to the costs of implementing each of the types of earnings 
management. Njoroge et al. (2015) and the previous hypotheses suggest a theoretical 
relationship between investor conflict and each type of earnings management. Earnings 
management through accrual manipulation affects the information environment for a 
firm. Earnings management through real activities manipulation affects the risk position 
of the firm. Both bondholders and shareholders use firm information to evaluate the value 
of investing in a firm. These investors will charge a premium to invest in a firm with an 
inferior information environment. In both cases, we expect that the effect of the earnings 
manipulation to affect conflict between bondholders and shareholders. 
H2: Real earnings management has a positive, significant effect on bondholder-
shareholder conflict. 
III. Models 
 The two hypotheses can be tested using regression models. Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) provide methods for determining the mediation relationship between variables. In 
these tests, we hypothesize that the relation between real earnings management and cost 
of equity is mediated by bondholder-shareholder conflict. This is formally test using the 
Sobel test for mediation. The Sobel test statistic is given by: 
𝑧𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑙 =  
𝑎 ∗ 𝑏
√(𝑏2𝑠𝑎2 + 𝑎2𝑠𝑏
2 + 𝑠𝑎2 ∗ 𝑠𝑏
2)
 
In this setup, a is the estimated coefficient for accruals quality on the regression on 
conflict, b is the estimated coefficient for conflict on the regression on cost of equity, and 
sa and sb are the standard error of the estimated coefficients on a and b, respectively. This 
test statistic is normally distributed, thus having the rejection region of ±1.96. 
For H1a, the regression model for the hypothesis test is 
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𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=3
+  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where C is the cost of equity, REM is the measure of real earnings management, Con is 
the measure of conflict between bondholders and shareholders, and xs are relevant 
control variables. The coefficient β1 represents the direct effect that real earnings 
management has on the cost of capital. The results of the Sobel test provide evidence 
with regard to hypothesis 1b. The output from this regression method will portray the 
level and significance of the effect of real earnings management directly on cost of 
capital and the effect of real earnings management on cost of capital indirectly through 
bondholder-shareholder conflict.  
IV. Variables 
Data for each of the models are gathered from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, IBES, and 
Kenneth French’s online data library. Summary statistics for the regression variables are 
presented in table 1. The dependent variable in the main regression is the cost of equity. 
This variable is calculated as the average of the Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. 
(2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) cost of equity metrics. The equations for each of 
these cost of equity metrics are presented in Appendix B.  
Bondholder-shareholder conflict is measured using the two-step method in 
Njoroge et al. (2015). The residuals from the regression of Leverage on determinants of 
optimal leverage represent the level of conflict between bondholders and shareholders. 
The calculation of this proxy is done with four calculations of Altman’s Z: the factors 
from the original Altman’s 1968 paper, factors calculated in the Begley et al. (1996), and 
two calculations provided in Shumway (2002).  
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Real earnings management proxies are calculated following Kim and Sohn 
(2013). This method is an extension of the real earnings management developed in 
Roychowdhury (2006). Kim and Sohn use abnormal cash flow, abnormal discretionary 
expenses, and abnormal production costs to proxy for Real Earnings management. The 
calculation of abnormal cash flow, Abnormal Discretionary Expenses and Abnormal 





































Where CFOt is cash flow from operations, At is assets, Salest is net sales, ∆Salest is 
the change in sales between t-1 and t, Prodt is production costs at time t, and DiscEXt is 
discretionary expenses (Advertising, Research and Development, and Selling, General, 
and Administrative expenses). I also calculate two other Roychowdhury (2006) measures 
for real earnings management of Abnormal Inventory Growth and Abnormal Cost of 
Goods Sold given by: 
∆𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1



















Where COGSt is the cost of goods sold and ∆INVt is the change in inventory between t-1 
and t. These regressions models are estimated for each of the Fama-French 48 industries. 
The abnormal level for each of the five variables is the actual amount observed for the 
firm minus the predicted value for that firm’s industry. Following Kim and Sohn (2013), 
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the tests use the unsigned (absolute value) level of abnormal activities and convert these 
values to rank variables for each of the measures. The tests further follow Kim and Sohn 
(2013) by using the average of the three measures as an independent variable to measure 
real earnings management. 
Accrual Quality is calculated following Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et 
al. (2004). In both cases, accrual quality is measured as the standard deviation of a ten-
year window of regressions. The equation used for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) is 
given by: 
∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where ∆WCt is the change in working capital from t-1 to t and CFOt is the cash flow 
from operations at time t. This regression is conducted for the ten-year window t-9 to t 
for each firm. The standard deviation of the error term is the measure of accrual quality 
for the firm at time t. Similarly, Francis et al. (2004) employ a regression method based 
on the equation: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡









+  𝜀𝑡 
TCAt is the firm’s total current accruals, CFOt is the Cash flow from operations at time t, 
and Assetst is the average of total assets at t-1 and t. The measure for accruals quality at 
time t is the standard deviation of the error term for a ten-year window t-9 to t. 
 Francis et al. (2005, pg. 305) provide two methods to deconstruct accruals quality 
into its discretionary and innate components. The first method is to use a regression 
where the dependent variable is firm accrual quality and the independent variables are the 
innate determinants of accrual quality. Innate determinants of accrual quality include the 
firm’s operating cycle (OP_CYCLE), the natural log of firm assets (LNAT), the standard 
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deviation of Cash flow from Operations and Sales (STD_SALE and STD_CFO), and a 
dummy variable that captures whether the firm had negative earnings in that period 
(NEG_EARN). The residuals from this regression represent the portion of accruals that 
are not innate, thus capturing discretionary accruals. The second method uses the 
standard accruals quality metric, but includes determinants of innate accrual quality in the 
cost of equity regression. With this method, the coefficient on accrual quality is 
interpreted as the effect of discretionary accruals on the firm’s cost of equity. For each 
measure of accrual quality or discretionary accrual quality, the variable is transformed 
into a rank variable to mitigate the effects of outliers as done in Kim and Sohn (2013). 
V. Results 
Table 2 presents results from the primary test of the hypothesis 1. The table reports 
each of the real earnings management variables used in Kim and Sohn (2013) as well as 
the average of all five of the measures used in Roychowdhury (2006). Each of the 
measures has a positive, significant relationship with cost of equity, thus supporting 
hypothesis 1a. The Sobel test for mediation is presented at the bottom of both panels of 
table 2. In each case, the null hypothesis of no mediation is rejected, thus supporting 
hypothesis 1b. 
Badertscher (2011) suggests that managers select earnings manipulations based on the 
ease of their implementation. Badertscher (2011) provides that this order is accruals 
quality, real earnings management, and finally financial fraud. Zang (2012) provides 
evidence that managers select between real earnings management and accruals 
manipulation based on the relative costs of each type of manipulation. Thus, the 
theoretical relationship between real earnings management and accruals quality remains 
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open. As a check for robustness, mediation by conflict in the relation between real 
earnings management and cost of equity is tested in alternate relationships between real 
earnings management and accruals quality. In table 3, accruals quality is treated as a 
secondary mediator in the cost of equity regression. In table 4, accruals quality is treated 
as a moderator for real earnings management. In both cases, real earnings management 
maintains a positive, significant coefficient in the cost of equity regression, thus 
supporting hypothesis 1a. In both cases, the Sobel test for mediation of real earnings 
management by bondholder-shareholder conflict is positive and significant, thus 
supporting hypothesis 1b. 
Table 5 reports regressions on bondholder-shareholder conflict by real earnings 
management and relevant controls. Results for the three measures of real earnings 
management used in Kim and Sohn (2013) and the five measures used in Roychowdhury 
(2006) are reported. Across both measures and model specifications, the relation between 
real earnings management and conflict is positive, thus supporting hypothesis 2. The 
Sobel test metrics in each of the model specifications is positive and significant. This 
implies that the effect of real earnings management is positive and significant. In all 
specifications, real earnings management has a positive, significant relationship with 
bondholder-shareholder conflict, thus supporting hypothesis 2. 
VI. Conclusions 
Real earnings management has been an important topic in accounting research. Using 
real earnings management to manipulate earnings affects both the information 
environment for a firm and the firm’s risk position. Evidence has shown that managers 
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use real earnings management to avoid negative earnings (Roychowdhury 2006) and that 
real earnings management increases a firm’s cost of equity (Kim and Sohn 2013).  
This paper investigates the relation between real earnings management, bondholder-
shareholder conflict, and cost of equity. A mediation relationship is hypothesized where 
conflict mediates the relationship between real earnings management and cost of equity. 
The empirical results support previous research in that real earnings management has a 
significant, positive direct effect on the cost of equity. Further, though, the mediation of 
real earnings management’s effect on cost of equity by bondholder-shareholder conflict is 
supported in multiple estimation environments.  
This paper contributes to the literature by further elucidating the determinants of a 
firm’s cost of equity. Previous research has shown that real earnings management affects 
cost of equity (Kim and Sohn, 2013) and that bondholder-shareholder conflict affects cost 
of equity (Njoroge et al. 2015). This research shows that real earnings management 
affects the level of bondholder-shareholder conflict and that this effect is significant to 







Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Number of Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R_CFO 64923 4.745 3.147 0.000 9.000 
R_PROD 62767 5.296 3.202 0.000 9.000 
R_DISCEX 57395 4.501 2.871 0.000 9.000 
AVR_REM3 64923 4.865 2.530 0.000 9.000 
AVR_REM5 64966 4.873 2.673 0.000 9.000 
R_AQ_D 39604 4.489 2.920 0.000 9.000 
R_AQ_F 39601 4.500 2.920 0.000 9.000 
R_DISC_D 39222 4.500 2.872 0.000 9.000 
R_DISC_F 39219 4.500 2.872 0.000 9.000 
BS_LEV_avg 32904 -0.005 0.240 -0.555 0.830 
CoE_GM 49260 0.099 0.394 -0.261 3.192 
CoE_GLS 42946 0.097 0.089 0.000 0.500 
CoE_CT 38636 0.093 0.096 0.000 0.500 
SMB 68099 2.206 11.295 -24.940 27.820 
HML 68099 4.257 14.671 -34.220 39.440 
Mkt_RF 68099 7.659 17.267 -38.350 32.450 
LIQ1 64024 0.826 2.059 -0.437 82.954 
TOB_Q 67951 1374.660 2294.060 -52665.090 105032.220 
AT 68099 2267.440 6816.670 7.956 48263.000 
B2M 33813 0.600 0.602 -0.736 3.629 
STDEV 68099 17.978 12.140 0.000 85.000 
STD_CFO 65805 90.190 497.288 0.000 39301.220 
STD_SALE 65805 533.981 2733.710 0.000 113894.810 
IN_INT 68099 0.148 0.297 0.000 23.980 
CAP_INT 68072 0.305 0.236 0.000 1.000 
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in analysis for the paper. Data is gathered 
from Compustat, CRSP, IBES and Kenneth French's online dataset. Cost of Equity measures follow 
Gode and Mohanram (2003), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gebhardt et al. (2001). Variable 
definitions can be found in Appendix A. 







Table 2: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of real earnings management 
and conflict 
       Panel A 
        Beta Std. Dev Beta Std. Dev Beta Std. Dev 
Real Earnings Management Measures: 
   R_CFO 0.0098 0.0017 
    R_DISCEX 
  
0.0042 0.0017 
  R_PROD 
    
0.0152 0.0017 
       Conflict 0.0589 0.0051 0.0409 0.0058 0.0581 0.0051 
       Controls: 
      Mkt_RF 0.0911 0.0043 0.0810 0.0043 0.1018 0.0046 
SMB -0.0142 0.0038 -0.0182 0.0039 -0.0276 0.0040 
HML 0.0338 0.0043 0.0341 0.0044 0.0327 0.0043 
LNAT 0.1165 0.0082 0.1295 0.0087 0.1198 0.0082 
STDEV 0.0240 0.0057 0.0175 0.0060 0.0236 0.0057 
LNB2M 0.1286 0.0046 0.1254 0.0047 0.1281 0.0046 
IN_INT 0.0302 0.0156 0.0354 0.0155 0.0333 0.0156 
CAP_INT 0.1142 0.0196 0.1252 0.0211 0.1150 0.0197 
LIQ1 -0.0059 0.0039 -0.0051 0.0046 -0.0054 0.0039 
NUMEST -0.0108 0.0009 -0.0109 0.0009 -0.0111 0.0009 
OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NEG_EARN 0.0245 0.0101 0.0411 0.0104 0.0263 0.0101 
STD_CFO 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
A_AQ 0.0047 0.0018 0.0045 0.0018 0.0043 0.0018 
       Sobel Test 0.0005 0.0002 0.0012 0.0002 0.0009 0.0002 












Table 2: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of real earnings management 
and conflict 
     Panel B         
  Beta Std. Dev Beta Std. Dev 
Real Earnings Management Measures: 
 AVG_REM3 0.0176 0.0023 
  AVR_REM5 
 
0.0205 0.0022 
     Conflict 0.0570 0.0051 0.0580 0.005 
     Controls: 
   Mkt_RF 0.0953 0.0044 0.0995 0.0044 
SMB -0.0195 0.0038 -0.0244 0.0039 
HML 0.0319 0.0043 0.0339 0.0043 
LNAT 0.1174 0.0082 0.1175 0.0082 
STDEV 0.0230 0.0057 0.0206 0.0057 
LNB2M 0.1276 0.0046 0.1281 0.0046 
IN_INT 0.0329 0.0156 0.0307 0.0156 
CAP_INT 0.1178 0.0196 0.1200 0.0196 
LIQ1 -0.0045 0.0039 -0.0052 0.0039 
NUMEST -0.0106 0.0009 -0.0105 0.0009 
OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NEG_EARN 0.0273 0.0101 0.027 0.0101 
STD_CFO 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
A_AQ 0.0046 0.0018 0.0046 0.0018 
     Sobel Test 0.0017 0.0003 0.0009 0.0002 
     F-Stat 134.72 
 
136.286 
 R-Squared 13.08   13.22   
This table presents Cost of Equity Regressions using regressors of real earnings 
management (REM) and Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. The real earnings 
management measures are calculated following Kim and Sohn (2013) and 
Roychowdhury (2006). The AVR_REM3 is the average of the three real earnings 
management Proxies used in Kim and Sohn (2013). AVR_REM5 is the average of all 
five Earnings Management Proxies presented in Roychowdhury (2006). The Sobel test is 
used to test for the indirect effect of REM on the Cost of Equity through Bondholder-







Table 3: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Real Earnings Management, 
Conflict, and Accruals Quality  
  Beta Std. Error 
AVG_REM3 0.0046 0.0018 
   Conflict 0.0570 0.0051 
   Controls: 
  Mkt_RF 0.0953 0.0044 
SMB -0.0195 0.0038 
HML 0.0319 0.0043 
LNAT 0.1174 0.0082 
STDEV 0.0230 0.0057 
LNB2M 0.1276 0.0046 
IN_INT 0.0329 0.0156 
CAP_INT 0.1178 0.0196 
LIQ1 -0.0045 0.0039 
NUMEST -0.0106 0.0009 
OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 
NEG_EARN 0.0273 0.0101 
STD_CFO 0.0000 0.0000 
STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 
A_AQ 0.0046 0.0018 
   Sobel Test 
 Conflict 0.0018 0.0003 
A_AQ 0.0001 0.0001 
   F-Stat 134.7204 
 R-Squared 13.08   
This table presents Cost of Equity Regressions using regressors of real earnings 
management (REM) and Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. The real earnings 
management measures are calculated following Kim and Sohn (2013). The AVR_REM3 
is the average of the three real earnings management Proxies used in Kim and Sohn 
(2013). The Sobel test is used to test for the indirect effect of REM on the Cost of Equity 
through Bondholder-Shareholder conflicts and Discretionary Accrual Quality. The F-Stat 








Table 4: Cost of Equity Regressions with measures of Real Earnings  
Management, Conflict, and Accruals Quality moderation 
  Beta Std. Error 
AVG_REM3 0.0212 0.004 
   Conflict 0.057 0.0051 
   Controls: 
  A_AQ 0.0073 0.0030 
int_1 -0.0008 0.0007 
Mkt_RF 0.0954 0.0044 
SMB -0.0195 0.0038 
HML 0.0319 0.0043 
LNAT 0.1172 0.0082 
STDEV 0.0230 0.0057 
LNB2M 0.1277 0.0046 
IN_INT 0.0328 0.0156 
CAP_INT 0.1178 0.0196 
LIQ1 -0.0045 0.0039 
NUMEST -0.0106 0.0009 
OP_CYCLE 0.0000 0.0000 
NEG_EARN 0.0272 0.0101 
STD_CFO 0.0000 0.0000 
STD_SALE 0.0000 0.0000 
   Sobel Test 0.0018 0.0004 
   F-Stat 127.3048 
 R-Squared 13.09   
This table presents Cost of Equity Regressions using regressors of real earnings 
management (REM) and Bondholder-Shareholder conflict. The real earnings 
management measures are calculated following Kim and Sohn (2013). The AVR_REM3 
is the average of the three real earnings management Proxies used in Kim and Sohn 
(2013). The Sobel test is used to test for the indirect effect of REM on the Cost of Equity 
through Bondholder-Shareholder conflicts. Mediation is for between real earnings 
management and Discretionary Accrual Quality with an interaction term. The F-Stat and 









Table 5: Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict regressions with measures of Real 
Earnings Management 
Panel A 
        
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
AVR_REM3 0.0259 0.0029 0.0373 0.0030 
     Controls: 









































     F-Stat 81.81 
 
470.34 
 R-Squared 0.25 
 
23.41 







Table 5: Bondholder-Shareholder Conflict regressions with measures of Real 
Earnings Management 
     Panel B         
  Beta Std. Error Beta Std. Error 
     
     AVR_REM5 0.0196 0.0027 0.0263 0.0027 
     Controls: 







































     F-Stat 53.61 
 
464.65 
 R-Squared 0.16 
 
23.19 
 N 32876   23040   
This table presents Bondholder-Shareholder conflict regressions using regressors of real 
earnings management (REM) in models 1 and 3 and REM variables and related controls 
in models 2 and 4. Models 2 and 4 are estimated with a time trend. The real earnings 
management measures are calculated following Kim and Sohn (2013) and 
Roychowdhury (2006). The AVR_REM3 is the average of the three real earnings 
management Proxies used in Kim and Sohn (2013). AVR_REM5 is the average of all 





Conflicts between bondholders and shareholders have been noted in the literature 
for decades. The nature of their conflict arises from the differential payout structure from 
the firm to the two investor groups. Debt investors (bondholders and any other holder of 
firm debt) receive their payment from the firm in the form of interest on that debt. Equity 
holders receive their benefit from the firm in terms of dividends and appreciation of their 
ownership stake in the firm.  This difference in how the two investor types receive value 
from investments leads to conflict on how firms should behave. Rational investors in the 
firm will recognize that this conflict exists and will price that conflict in stock price of the 
firm.  
In research regarding bondholder-shareholder conflict, many theoretical 
relationships of this sort have been proposed. However, the empirical work related to this 
conflict is extremely limited. The currently used proxies for conflict used in the literature 
map to multiple theoretical constructs, making their interpretation problematic. Thus, 
empirical research regarding theories developed regarding this conflict is limited.   
 This dissertation attempts to fill a void in capital markets research in two ways. 
First, this dissertation develops a proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict in paper 1. 
This proxy is tested and shown to behave as expected based on theory. Second, this proxy 
is used to test the relationship between earnings manipulation, conflict, and the cost of 
capital. Earnings manipulation by accruals quality is examined in paper 2, while earnings 
manipulation by real earnings management is examined in paper 3. 
 Taken together, the results of this dissertation show evidence that the conflict 
proxy is valid and that it behaves as expected with respect to other potential measures of 
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conflict and cost of equity. The dissertation further provides evidence that conflict affects 
the relationship between earnings management and cost of equity. The evidence supports 
that earnings management increases conflict between bondholders and shareholders.  
 The main contribution of this dissertation to the literature is the development of 
the proxy for bondholder-shareholder conflict. This allows for empirical testing of 
hypotheses that include conflict, which makes a wide range of empirical tests possible. 
This also allows for an empirical control for conflict in tests where conflict affects the 
variables of interest. Further, this dissertation contributes to the literature by providing 
insight into the relation between earnings manipulation and cost of equity. Specifically, 
earnings manipulation is shown to increase conflicts, thus providing a secondary effect 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
CoE_GM Cost of Equity from Gode and Mohanram (2003) 
CoE_CT Cost of Equity from Claus and Thomas (2001) 
CoE_GLS Cost of Equity from Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) 
CoE_AVG The average of the calculations of Cost of Equity from Claus and 
Thomas (2001), Gebhardt et al. (2001), and Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) 
CoD Cost of Debt calculated as Interest Divided by Long-Term Liabilities 
LEV Leverage calculated as Total Liabilities divided by Total Assets. 
BS_LEV_a68 The residuals from the first-step regression of Leverage on Various 
determinants of leverage. The first step regression uses AltZ_68 as a 
proxy for bankruptcy costs. 
BS_LEV_a96 The residuals from the first-step regression of Leverage on Various 
determinants of leverage. The first step regression uses AltZ_96 as a 
proxy for bankruptcy costs. 
BS_LEV_as1 The residuals from the first-step regression of Leverage on Various 
determinants of leverage. The first step regression uses AltZ_s1 as a 
proxy for bankruptcy costs. 
BS_LEV_as2 The residuals from the first-step regression of Leverage on Various 
determinants of leverage. The first step regression uses AltZ_s2 as a 
proxy for bankruptcy costs. 
BS_LEV_avg The average of the four regression-based proxies for conflict. 
AT Total Assets 
SMB The 'Small minus Big' market capitalization risk factor from the 
Fama French three factor model 
HML The 'High minus Low' book to market ratio risk factor from the Fama 
French three factor model 
Mkt_RF The Market return minus the risk free rate of return from the Fama 
French three factor model 
B2M The book to market ratio 
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LIQ1 Liquidity of the firm as measured by Cash divided by current 
liabilities 
TAX The firm's average tax rate from COMPUSTAT, measured by total 
taxes paid divided by pretax income 
TOB_Q Tobin's Q as calculated by the sum of market value of equity, 
liquidation value of preferred stock, short term debt net of short term 
liabilities, and long term liabilities divided by total assets (Chung and 
Pruett 1994). 
AltZ_68 Altman's Z score calculated using the original paper's Multiple 
Discriminant Analysis coefficients for the five factors 
AltZ_96 Altman's Z score calculated using the factors calculated by Begley, 
Ming, and Watts (1996) as reported in Shumway (2002) 
AltZ_S1 Altman's Z score calculated using the factors calculated by Shumway 
2002 for the period 1962-1982 
AltZ_S2 Altman's Z score calculated using the factors calculated by Shumway 
2002 for the period 1962-1992 
STDEV_forecast Analyst forecast dispersion from IBES dataset 
ConvPerc Percentage of total capital structure that is comprised of convertible 
debt 
ConvDebt Percentage of long-term debt that is comprised of convertible debt 
CAP1 Measure of capital structure imbalance between debt and equity. This 
is calculated by taking the absolute value of Long-term debt scaled 
by total assets minus stockholders equity scaled by total assets. This 
metric is then multiplied by negative 1.  
R_AQ_D Accrual Quality Measure from Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
R_AQ_F Accrual Quality Measure from Francis et al. (2004) 
A_AQ Average of the Accrual Quality Measures from Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) and Francis et al. (2004) 
R_DISC_D Discretionary Accrual Quality measure calculated using the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model using the method reported in Francis et al. 
(2004) 
R_DISC_F Discretionary Accrual Quality measure calculated using the Francis 
et al. (2004) model and method 
A_DISCAQ Average of the discretionary accrual measures using the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2004) models 
R_CFO Abnormal Cash Flows from Kim and Sohn (2013) 
R_DISCEX Abnormal Discretionary Expenses from Kim and Sohn (2013) 
R_PROD Abnormal Production from Kim and Sohn (2013) 
AVR_REM3 Average of the three real earnings management measures as 
calculated in Kim and Sohn (2013) 
AVR_REM5 Average of the five Real Earnings Measures from Roychowdhury 
(2006), following the calculations in Kim and Sohn (2013) 
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NUMEST Number of analysts' forecasts from the IBES dataset 
IN_INT The sum of Advertising and Selling, General, and Administrative 
expenses divided by Total Assets 
CAP_INT Property, Plant, and Equipment divided by Total Assets 
OP_CYCLE Operating Cycle as calculated by the log of the sum of Days 
Inventory and Days Accounts Receivable 
STD_CFO Standard deviation of firm level annual Cash Flows from Operations 
STD_SALES Standard deviation of firm level Sales 









 Appendix B: Cost of Equity Calculations 
Cost of Equity 
Calculation 







𝑟𝐺𝑀 = 𝐴 +  √𝐴2 +
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
(𝑔 − (𝛾 − 1)) 
𝐴 =  
1
2










epst = expected earnings per share at time t 
dpst = Expected dividend per share at time t 
P0 = initial price of the firm
′s stock 
γ = risk − free rate of return minus 3%  







𝑀𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡 +  ∑





𝐸𝑡[(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+12 − 𝑟𝐺𝐿𝑆) ∗ 𝐵𝑡+11]




Mt = market equity at time t 
Bt = Book Value of the firm at time t 
ROEt = expected return on equity at time t 
rGLS








Thomas (2001) 𝑀𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡 +  ∑





𝐸𝑡[(𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡+5 − 𝑟𝐶𝑇) ∗ 𝐵𝑡+4](1 + 𝑔)




Mt = market equity at time t 
Bt = Book Value of the firm at time t 
ROEt = expected return on equity at time t 
g = risk free rate of return minus 3% 
rCT = The Claus and Thomas (2001) cost of equity 
 
 
